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Abstract	In	this	paper	we	discuss	the	problems	of	modern	representative	democracy	and	we	look	at	 the	 selection	 of	 legislators	 by	 lot	 as	 a	way	 to	 tame	 some	 of	 the	 drawbacks	 of	 that	system.	 It	 is	 recalled	 at	 the	 beginning	 that	 resorting	 to	 sortition	 for	 the	 selection	 of	public	 officers	 used	 to	 be	 a	 popular	 way	 of	 taming	 factionalism	 in	 public	 affairs.	Factionalism	is	assumed	to	be	detrimental	to	public	affairs	as	public	officers	may	favour	their	own	faction	(a	tribe	or	a	party)	instead	of	pursuing	the	general	interest.	Moreover	they	tend	to	overinvest	in	strengthening	their	power,	thus	engaging	in	power	struggles	with	 opposing	 factions,	 unlikely	 to	 benefit	 society.	 In	 this	 respect	 we	 present	 a	 new	mathematical	model	aiming	at	describing	a	more	efficient	parliament	where	sortition	is	brought	 to	 bear.	 It	 will	 be	 shown	 that	 starting	 from	 a	 parliament	 working	 with	 two	parties	(or	coalitions),	where	the	costs	of	representative	democracy	are	quite	apparent	through	the	detrimental	effects	of	party	discipline,	one	can	beneficially	move	towards	a	parliament	 where	 independent	 legislators,	 randomly	 selected	 from	 the	 population	 of	constituents,	sit	alongside	elected	members	who	belong	to	a	party	and	are	subjected	to	party	discipline.	The	paper	shows	that	increasing	the	number	of	independent	legislators	up	 to	 a	 point	 enhances	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 parliament	 and	 puts	 into	 check	 the	factionalism	likely	to	arise	from	party	discipline.	 
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1.	Introduction		Resorting	on	random	procedures	when	it	comes	to	grant	powers,	assign	public	functions		or	take	 collective	 decisions	 has	 been	 interpreted	 in	 different	 ways	 in	 the	 recent	 literature.1	Lockard	(2003),	 for	example,	 looks	at	 those	procedures	as	ways	of	contrasting	rent-seeking	behaviour.	Similarly,	Stone	(2011)	and	Delannoi,	Dowlen	and	Stone	(2013)	emphasize	 their	role	in	fighting	corruption.	Others,	like	Callenbach	and	Phillips	(2008)	or	Callenbach,	Phillips	and	Sutherland	(2008),	look	at	sortition	as	a	way	to	accurately	represent	a	diverse	population	in	a	smaller	subset.	Finally	Stone	(2016)	shows	under	what	conditions	sortition	makes	sure	societies	achieve	allocative	justice.			Sortition	has	also	been	considered	as	a	way	to	fix	some	specific	drawbacks	of	contemporary	political	systems.	See,	for	example,	the	thought-provoking	proposals	in	Frey	(2017)2.		Following	 the	 line	 set	 in	 Dowlen	 (2008	 and	 2017),	 this	 paper	 places	 sortition	 among	 the	instruments	 designed	 to	 fight	 concentration	 of	 political	 power.	 Some	 of	 the	 undesirable	effects	of	political	power,	especially	those	currently	more	widespread,	like	corruption,	elitism,	self-referential	 behaviour,	 are	often	 attributed	 to	 such	 a	 concentration.	Viewed	 in	 this	way,	sortition	parallels	other	mechanisms	designed	to	keep	political	power	in	check,	 like	division	of	powers,	universal	suffrage,	political	term	limits,	rotational	assignment.			As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 through	 history,	 sortition	 has	 done	 quite	 a	 good	 job	 in	 harnessing	 a	specific	source	of	power	concentration,	i.e.	factionalism.	By	factionalism	we	mean	a	tendency	to	strengthen	bonds	within	a	group,	usually	in	opposition	to	other	groups,	with	the	purpose	of	gaining	 more	 power.	 When	 such	 bonds	 are	 particularly	 strong,	 factionalism	 may	 lead	 to	excessive	 concentration	 of	 power.	 If	 a	 faction	 holds	 a	 government	 office,	 it	 may	 use	 the	benefits	 arising	 from	 that	 office	 to	 strengthen	 those	bonds	 even	more,	with	 the	purpose	 of	fighting	 opposing	 factions.	 Eventually	 this	 may	 lead	 to	 relax	 the	 pursuance	 of	 the	 general	interest.3		Factionalism4	is	 not	 a	 new	development.	 Throughout	 history	 it	 has	 taken	 up	 various	 forms	and	has	worked	through	various	mechanisms,	as	Dowlen	(2008)	already	argued.	Its	current	parliamentary	 version	 is	 party	 discipline.	 Party	 discipline	 is	 called	 for	 whenever	 internal	cohesion	is	required	to	stress	group	identity	against	opposing	parties.5	Resuming	lot	as	a	way	to	contrast	factionalism,	in	this	paper	we	present	a	mathematical	model	of	a	parliament	with	a	bipolar	party	composition,	where	an	additional	component	of	legislators,	selected	by	lot	and																																																									1	Arrow	(1963,	pp.	20-21)	argued	that	probabilistic	methods	could	even	overcome	the	“impossibility”	of	his	own	theory.	2	See	the	related	responses	by	Köppl-Turyna	(2018)	and	Tridimas	(2018).	3	As	any	other	tyranny,	the	tyrannie	de	la	majorité,	which	De	Tocqueville	(1850)	cautioned	against,	may	be	considered	as	a	case	of	factionalism.	4	Chan	and	Man	(2012)	point	to	a	number	of	incentives	underlying	factionalism	that	can	facilitate	its	inception.	5	Eguia	(2011)	identifies	some	incentives	to	make	party	discipline	effective.	For	a	broader	overview	of	the	topic,	see	Bowler, Farrell and Katz (1999). 
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independent	of	parties,	is	introduced.	In	line	with	a	previous	exploratory	studies	(Pluchino	et	
al.	 2010	 and	 Pluchino	 et	 al.,	 2011), the	 model	 shows	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 sortition	 in	mitigating	 the	detrimental	effects	of	party	discipline,	and	 thus	of	 inefficient	public	decision-making.	 The	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	The	second	section	surveys	how	sortition	has	been	used	in	history	as	a	way	 to	 fight	 factionalism.	The	 third	section	 introduces	 the	mathematical	model	and	the	fourth	section	addresses	the	analytical	calculation	of	the	parliament’s	efficiency	in	the	two	limiting	cases	of	only	two	parties	or	only	independent	legislators.	Section	5	presents	the	results	 for	 the	most	general	case	of	a	mixed	parliament,	with	both	parties	and	 independent	legislators,	while	section	6	looks	for	its	maximum	efficiency.	Finally,	section	7	discusses	some	interesting	 proposals,	 based	 on	 the	 paper’s	 results,	 for	 repairing	 representative	 democracy	and	 section	 8	 concludes	 the	 paper.	 Details	 of	 analytical	 calculations	 are	 presented	 in	 four	appendices.			
	
	
2.	Sortition	versus	factionalism		The	first	 instance	of	sortition	as	a	way	to	organize	power	goes	back	to	ancient	Athens,	as	 is	very	 well	 known.	 However,	 we	 do	 not	 have	 unambiguous	 evidence	 of	 the	 time	 and	 the	circumstances	when	all	this	started.6	Unlike	what	happened	during	the	Italian	Renaissance,	in	ancient	Athens	sortition	was	not	intended	to	extend	participation;	women,	minors	and	slaves	remained	outside	political	 life.	Instead,	sortition	came	to	be	seen	as	a	way,	among	others,	to	contrast	 the	 tendency	 to	 establish	 solid	 bonds	 among	 individuals,	 lest	 such	 bonds	 could	jeopardize	the	attainment	of	social	welfare.			Therefore,	sortition	was	not	jus	a	way	to	select	politicians.	It	must	be	said,	in	passing,	that	a	large	 literature	 exists	 already	 on	 this	 particular	 view	 of	 the	 issue.7	Indeed,	 sortition	 was	intended	also	differently,	as	a	way	to	mould	and	direct	political	action.	 	One	can	 look	at	 the	way	constituencies	were	reformed	in	ancient	Athens	to	find	evidence	of	this	other	purpose	of	sortition.	It	was	Kleisthenes	who	put	ten	tribes	in	place	of	the	long-established	four	tribes.			According	to	Aristotle	(1986)8,	Kleisthenes	broke	up	the	Athenian	region	into	thirty	 	groups	called	trittyes:	ten	from	the	city,	ten	from	the	coast	and	ten	from	the	inland.	Coming	from	the	same	region,	each	trittys	was	highly	homogeneous.	Therefore,	the	trittyes	were	very	likely	to	turn	into	opposing	factions,	as	they	represented	diverse	interests.	Turning	to	lot	avoided	this	occurrence,	as	each	 tribe	was	made	up	of	 three	different	 trittyes,	one	coming	 from	the	city,	one	 from	the	coast	and	one	 from	the	 inland.	Establishing	 tribes	not	according	 to	 family	 ties	but	according	to	place	of	birth	made	clear	the	true	purpose	of	lot:	preventing	the	formation	of	strong	bonds	and	emasculating	the	existing	ones.	In	turn,	those	ten	tribes	would	make	up	the	population	the	500	members	of	the	Boule,	established	by	Klisthenes	in	508-507	B.C.,	would	be	taken	from	by	lot.	Fifty	representatives	would	be	selected	from	each	tribe.			That	sortition	by	lot	in	ancient	Athens	was	mainly	designed	to	fight	factionalism	is	borne	out	by	two	accompanying	features	of	sortition.	First,	public	officers	could	not	hold	the	same	office	twice.	The	only	exception	was	 the	Boule.	 In	 that	 case	 the	office	 could	be	held	 twice.	This	 is	explained	by	the	limited	number	of	eligible	individuals	with	respect	to	the	number	of	selected																																																									6	On	the	non-political	origins	of	sortition,	see	Dowlen	(2017),	p.	31	ff.	7	Delannoi	and	Dowlen	(2016)	lists	several	old	and	current	ways	for	implementing	political	sortition. 8	P.	164.	
	 4	
representatives.	If	only	one	term	had	been	possible,	it	might	have	been	difficult	to	fill	all	the	available	seats	in	the	Boule.	Second,	office	could	be	held	only	for	one	year.	This	time	was	too	short	 for	 factionalism	 to	 re-emerge.	Hence,	 lot,	 term	 limits,	 short	 time	 in	office,	 all	 seem	 to	work	 in	 the	same	direction:	preventing	personal	or	group	bonds	 from	becoming	stable	and	strong.	Failing	all	these	devices,	the	rule	of	majority	would	very	likely	yield	opposing	blocks	fiercely	competing	for	power.			Sortition	 became	 very	 popular	 in	 Italian	 city-states	 between	 the	 late	 Middle	 Ages	 and	 the	Renaissance.	 The	 ‘Brevia’	 and	 the	 ‘Scrutinio	 e	 tratta’9	were	 the	 two	 main	 instances.	 The	‘Brevia’	 spread	 across	 Northern	 Italy	 between	 the	 twelfth	 and	 the	 thirteenth	 century	 and	survived	 in	 the	 version	 that	 got	 established	 in	Venice	until	 the	beginning	of	 the	nineteenth	century.	The	‘Scrutinio	e	tratta’	was	developed	in	Florence	at	the	beginning	of	the	fourteenth	century	and	survived	for	one	and	a	half	century.			There	 is	 evidence	 that	 in	 the	 ‘Scrutinio’	 sortition	 was	 precisely	 designed	 to	 overcome	opposition	among	existing	 factions.	After	 the	death	of	 the	Duke	of	Lucca	who	 in	1328	gave	back	to	the	Florentine	the	right	to	choose	their	government,	how	to	achieve	that	became	an	issue	to	be	discussed.	 In	that	discussion	 it	clearly	emerged	that	 the	ultimate	purpose	of	any	reform	should	be	getting	rid	of	factions.	10		A	few	months	later	Florence	adopted	the	‘Scrutinio	
e	tratta’	scheme.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that,	alongside	that	scheme,	it	was	ruled	out	that	the	relatives	of	those	who	had	been	selected	through	sortition	for	a	public	office	could	be	selected	themselves	for	the	same	office.	Again	sortition	proves	to	be	designed	mainly	to	stave	off	fights	among	opposing	factions,	the	underlying	assumption	being	that	those	fights	are	not	good	for	society.			Similar	evidence	exists	in	the	case	of	‘Brevia’.	The	Statute	of	the	city	of	Parma	introduced	the	‘Brevia’	 in	 1233;	 there,	 sortition	 is	 clearly	 presented	 as	 a	 means	 to	 avoid	 contentiones.11	Interestingly,	the	‘Brevia’	and	the	‘Scrutinio’	mirrored	each	other.	In	the	‘Brevia’	sortition	came	at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	whole	 selection	 procedure	 through	 the	 selection	 by	 lot	 of	 a	 pool	 of	electors	(nominators	in	Venice).	Once	selected	the	electors	would	go	on	to	vote	or	nominate	their	 representatives.	 The	 ‘Scrutinio’	 would	 work	 the	 other	 way	 round.	 First,	 the	 pool	 of	representatives	 would	 be	 elected.	 Then,	 starting	 from	 that	 pool,	 public	 offices	 would	 be	allocated	by	lot.	Using	sortition	interchangeably,	at	different	stages	of	the	selection	procedure,	shows	that	the	purpose	of	sortition	is	really	fighting	factionalism,	just	like	ancient	Greece.			Furthermore,	 it	 shows	 that	 random	 procedures	 can	 coexist	 with	 teleological	 ones.	 At	 that	time,	 therefore,	 in	 the	 Italian	 city-states,	 running	 across	 the	 Renaissance,	 there	 was	 no	presumption	 that	 random	 selection	 of	 public	 officers	 would	 be	 superior	 to	 teleological	selection	 through	 voting.	 There	 was	 no	 presumption,	 that	 is,	 that	 wisdom	 is	 smoothly	distributed	across	the	population	or	that	qualitative	differences	among	individuals	eligible	to	public	office	were	 irrelevant,	with	 the	effect	of	making	 rational,	 intentional	 and	 teleological	selection	entirely	useless.																																																											9	Cfr.	Najemy	(1982)	for	‘scrutinio	e	tratta’	and	Wolfson	(1899)	for	‘brevia’.	10	“Dappoich’è	Fiorentini	ebbono	novelle	della	morte	del	duca,	ebbono	più	consigli	e	ragionamenti	e	avvisi,	come	
dovessono	riformare	la	città	di	reggimento	e	signoria	per	modo	comune,	acciocché	si	levassono	le	sette	tra’	
cittadini”:	Villani	(1845),	III,	p.103.	11	“Capitulum	ad	evitandum	quod	aliquis	qui	non	sit	de	consilio	generali	debeat	stare	ad	sortes	recipiendas,	et	ad	
evitandum	contentiones	super	hoc”:	Statuta	Communis	Parmae	(1855),	II,	p.	39.	In	fact,	beyond	factions,	sortition	was	also	intended	to	reduce	corruption	and	violence:	see	Wolfson	(1899),	p.	12.	
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Intentional	selection	of	individuals	for	public	office	was	simply	placed	alongside	sortition	by	lot.	 The	 sheer	 sum	 of	 individual	 wills,	 to	 be	 turned	 into	 collective	 will,	 would	 not	 yield	 a	sensible	outcome.	Sortition	would	add	to	the	conscious	choice	of	representatives	something	that	choice	could	not	offer.	Sortition	 is	neutral,	as	 it	 rules	out	persuasion.	 It	also	 implies	no	responsibility,	as	it	rules	out	mandate.	Both	elements	could	prove	to	be	useful.		It	 must	 be	 stressed	 that	 in	 the	 cases	 mentioned	 before	 sortition	 by	 lot	 –	 and	 thus	 the	unpredictability	 of	 outcomes	 -	 has	 in	 actual	 fact	 contributed	 to	 reduce	 factionalism.	 The	frequent	 turnover	of	members	of	 bodies	 like	 the	Athenian	Boule	or	 the	Florentine	 Signoria	made	it	very	difficult	for	individual	members	to	establish	a	reputation.	Quite	clearly	this	made	the	discussions	and	negotiations	necessary	to	reach	collective	agreements	rather	lengthy	and	difficult.	In	economic	parlance	this	implied	high	transaction	costs.	The	practice	of	log-rolling,	i.e.	the	exchange	of	favours,	was	as	a	result	of	such	difficulties	unlikely	to	develop,	both	within	and	 among	 factions.	 Thus,	 by	 weakening	 the	 likely	 bonds	 to	 be	 established	 within	 each	political	group,	sortition	has	done	a	good	job	in	contrasting	factionalism,	usually	considered	detrimental	to	orderly	public	life.	However,	in	contemporary	parliaments	the	longer	political	terms	and	the	possibility	of	running	for	the	same	office	more	than	once	has,	with	the	aid	of	party	discipline,	reduced	transaction	costs	but	increased	the	practice	of	log-rolling.			The	mathematical	model	we	 are	 going	 to	present	 in	 the	next	 sections	displays	members	of	parliament	distinguished	according	to	whether	they	are	subjected	or	not	to	party	discipline.	In	 the	 model	 party	 discipline	 is	 taken	 to	 represent	 all	 the	 features	 of	 a	 system	 prone	 to	factionalism,	 like	 long	political	 terms	or	 running	more	 than	once	 for	 the	 same	office.	 In	 the	model,	 party	discipline	 implies	 that	 all	members	of	 the	 group	 follow	 the	party	 leader	 in	 all	their	decisions.	In	case	party	discipline	does	not	apply,	everybody	will	decide	independently	of	each	other	and	factionalism	is	put	 into	check.	Freeing	members	of	parliament	 from	party	discipline,	therefore,	helps	lot	yield	all	its	beneficial	effects.				
3.	Modelling	a	parliament		We	 assume	 that	 voting	 is	 the	 way	 individuals	 take	 collective	 decisions.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 a	parliament	 (or	 any	 other	 deliberative	 body)	 those	 decisions	 are	 acts	 of	 parliament.	 The	problem	we	are	trying	to	address	here	is	whether	the	whole	job	of	making	decisions	(the	job	of	members	of	parliament)	can	yield	better	results	by	changing	the	composition	of	parliament.	To	this	end,	prospective	decisions	(or	proposed	acts	of	parliament)	are	ordered	according	to	the	 social	 gain	 they	 are	 capable	 of	 generating,	 from	 the	 least	 beneficial	 ones	 (or	 the	most	harmful)	 to	 the	most	 beneficial	 ones.	 Decisions	 are	 submitted	 to	 parliament.	 In	 actual	 fact,	only	those	decisions	that	command	a	majority	of	votes	are	taken.	Since	the	bunch	of	decisions	taken	 at	 any	 given	 run	 of	 parliament	may	 differ	 in	 the	 aggregate	 social	 gain	 it	manages	 to	generate,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	 ask	whether	 different	 compositions	 of	 parliament	may	 have	 a	differential	impact	on	that	aggregate	social	gain.			There	 is	no	discussion	in	the	following	on	the	way	such	an	ordering	 is	set	up.	 It	 is	assumed	right	 at	 the	 beginning	 that	 it	 is	 a	 socially	 accepted	 ordering.	 Therefore	 it	 is	 accepted	 by	members	of	parliament,	as	well.	However,	members	of	parliament	may	have	a	different	idea	as	 to	 the	 threshold	 that	 makes	 a	 given	 proposal	 acceptable	 or	 not.	 In	 the	 following	 it	 is	assumed	 that	 members	 of	 parliament	 are	 distributed	 equally	 across	 the	 socially	 accepted	ordering	of	decisions,	so	that	we	have	members	who	would	be	prepared	to	accept	anything,	however	low	may	be	the	social	contribution	the	decision	is	supposed	to	make,	and	members	
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of	 parliament	 who	 expect	 decisions	 to	 produce	 a	 significant	 contribution	 to	 social	 welfare	before	they	can	be	prepared	to	vote	in	their	favour.			The	 way	 proposals	 are	 submitted	 is	 not	 going	 to	 affect	 the	 way	 proposals	 are	 voted.	 This	means	that	submission	could	be	modelled	in	many	different	ways.	It	is	assumed	here	that	it	is	legislators	who	take	the	responsibility	for	submitting	proposals.	They	are	expected	to	submit	the	same	number	of	proposals.	It	goes	without	saying	that	individual	proposals	must	meet	the	threshold	associated	to	each	legislator.	In	this	particular	case	it	is	assumed	that	the	threshold	is	just	met.	Legislators	submit	proposals	that	are	expected	to	generate	a	social	gain	no	larger	or	smaller	than	their	personal	welfare	threshold.			A	well	functioning	parliament	is	one	which,	during	any	single	term,	can	be	expected	to	yield	the	 best	 possible	 results,	 as	 measured	 by	 the	 aggregate	 social	 welfare	 gain.	 Ideally,	parliaments	should	be	prepared	to	pass	only	those	acts	that	produce	positive	contributions	to	welfare.	 In	 fact,	members	 of	 parliament	may	 be	 prepared	 to	 accept	 even	 acts	 that	 produce	negative	contributions	to	welfare.	If	a	majority	for	those	acts	can	be	put	together,	those	acts	will	 be	 passed,	 thus	 producing	 a	 negative	 contribution	 to	 social	 welfare.	 The	 following	analysis	 is	 designed	 to	 look	 for	 those	 conditions	 required	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 parliaments	reduce	the	risk	of	making	negative	contributions	to	welfare.			In	the	following	we	first	present	a	one	dimensional	mathematical	model	of	a	parliament	with	
N	members	(legislators)	Ai	(i=1,…,N)	and	two	parties	(or	coalitions),	 the	majority	party	(P1)	and	the	opposition	(minority)	party	(P2).	From	now	on	we	will	consider	the	terms	“party”	and	“coalition”	as	synonymous,	since	our	model	applies	indistinctly	to	both	of	them.	For	the	time	being	we	set	the	percentage	of	legislators	of	the	two	parties	as:	P1	=	60%	and	P2	=	40%.			During	a	given	Legislature	L,	each	 legislator	can	perform	only	 two	actions:	submitting	a	bill	for	approval	and	voting	in	favour	or	against	any	bill.	Legislators	are	represented	as	points	of	a	1D	space,	i.e.	of	an	horizontal	axis	indicated	with	the	capital	letter	Y.	Each	point	of	this	Y-axis,	associated	to	a	real	number	in	the	interval	[-1,+1],	shows	the	(average)	social	gain	attached	to	the	 bill	 submitted	 by	 the	 legislator	 Ak.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 this	 represents	 the	 welfare	threshold	 below	 which	 the	 legislator	 is	 not	 prepared	 to	 go	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 vote.	 In	 a	previous	study	(A.	Pluchino	et	al.,	2011)	we	considered	a	2D	model	of	parliament,	where	two	different	thresholds	were	associated	to	each	legislator,	one	related	to	a	personal	interest	(X-axis)	and	another	related	to	the	social	welfare	(Y-axis).	 In	the	1D	version	employed	here,	to	make	the	model	simpler	and	more	suitable	for	an	analytical	approach,	we	explicitly	consider	only	the	second	threshold	(maintaining	the	same	name	for	the	axis),	but	somehow	account	for	the	influence	of	the	personal	interest	(as	explained	later).			Within	 the	 1D	 space,	 the	 distributions	 of	 legislators	 belonging	 to	 the	 two	 parties	 can	 be	represented,	in	the	limit	for	N>>1,	as	two	probability	density	functions	(PDF)	defined	over	the	Y-axis	 (see	 Figure	 1).	 Both	 the	 distributions	 P1(Y)	 and	 P2(Y)	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 Gaussians,	with	 means	 <Y1>	 and	 <Y2>,	 and	 with	 the	 same	 standard	 deviation	 𝜎.	 Both	 the	 curves	 are	normalized	to	have	unitary	area,	but	the	size	of	the	P2	curve	in	this	and	in	the	next	figures	has	been	reduced	only	in	order	to	distinguish	it	at	a	first	sight.				For	a	given	legislative	term	L,	the	centroids	<	Y1	>	and	<	Y2	>	of	the	distributions	are	fixed	and	randomly	chosen	in	the	interval	[-1	+	𝜎,	1	–	𝜎].	During	each	parliamentary	term	(legislature),	we	assume	 that	 each	 legislator	puts	 forward	 the	 same	number	of	proposals.	Therefore,	 the	overall	percentage	of	proposals	coming	from	the	members	of	a	particular	party	is	equal	to	the	
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percentage	of	legislators	of	that	party.	Since	the	Y	coordinate	of	each	legislator	represents	the	social	 gain	 of	 her	 proposal,	 the	 distributions	 P1(Y)	 and	 P2(Y)	 can	 be	 also	 regarded	 as	 the	distributions	of	their	proposals.					 												 Figure	1.	Gaussian	distributions	of	legislators	belonging	to	the	two	parties	P1(Y)	and	P2(Y).	The	two	curves	also	represent	the	distributions	of	proposals	coming	from	the	two	parties.			When	it	comes	to	voting	a	given	proposal,	say	p*	with	abscissa	Y*,	party	discipline	applies	for	each	 legislator	 Ak.	 Suppose	 Ak	belongs	 to	 the	 majority	 party	 P1	 (but	 of	 course	 the	 same	considerations	hold	also	for	P2),	there	are	two	possibilities:			
• p*	 is	 an	 internal	 proposal	 (i.e.	 it	 comes	 from	 a	member	 of	 P1):	 it	 is	 accepted	 by	 Ak	regardless	of	its	social	gain	Y*;			
• p*	 is	 an	 external	 proposal	 (i.e.	 it	 comes	 from	 a	member	 of	 the	 other	 party	 P2):	 it	 is	accepted	 only	 if	 	 Y*	 is	 greater	 than	 the	 party	 mean	 <	 Y1	>,	 which	 represents	 the	
minimum	social	gain	which	a	proposal	coming	from	legislators	of	P2	should	yield	to	be	accepted	by	 legislators	 of	 P1;	moreover,	 if	 this	 condition	 is	 fulfilled,	we	 assume	 that,	due	to	 internal	motivations	(personal	 interests)	of	P1	,	only	50%	of	 its	 legislators	will	accept	the	proposal.		Proposals	 are	 accepted	by	parliament	 provided	 they	 receive	half	 plus	 one	 (N/2	+	1)	 of	 the	votes.	Due	to	party	discipline	for	internal	proposals,	this	requirement	will	be	always	fulfilled	for	 the	majority	 party	 P1,	 which	 alone	 owns	 60	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 legislators.	We	 should	 not	forget,	 however,	 the	 proposals	 of	 the	 opposition	 party.	 The	 final	 number	 of	 accepted	proposals	at	the	end	of	a	term	will	depend	also	on	the	contribution	of	the	opposition	Party	P2,	whose	proposals	are	voted	inasmuch	as	the	majority	party	likes	them.	Therefore,	the	number	of	opposition	party	proposals,	which	 finally	gets	 to	be	approved,	should	also	depend	on	the	relative	position	of	the	two	parties	along	the	Y	axis.			Actually,	 as	 already	mentioned,	 due	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 personal	 interests,	 only	 one	half	 of	members	of	P1	will	vote	 for	 the	opposition	proposals	 lying	on	the	right	of	 the	P1	mean.	This	means	that,	for	these	proposals	(indicated	by	the	dark	parts	of	the	P2	Gaussians	in	Figure	2),	30%	of	legislators	belonging	to	P1	will	sum	their	vote	to	the	40%	of	legislators	belonging	to	P2,	thus	always	exceeding	the	N/2+1	threshold	necessary	for	the	approval	of	the	proposals.	
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	 										 				Figure	2.	A	couple	of	example	where	the	fraction	of	accepted	proposals	coming	from	P2	(in	dark	blue)	are	shown	as	function	of	the	relative	positions	of	the	two	parties.				In	this	paper	we	will	always	consider	a	sequence	of	NL	parliamentary	terms,	each	one	with	a	different	 random	 position	 of	 the	 centroids	 of	 both	 parties.	 It	 is	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 that,	averaging	 over	 many	 terms	 (NL>>1),	 the	 asymptotic	 distributions	 of	 both	 parties	 will	 be	centred	at	Y=0	(see	Figure	3).	In	the	following	we	will	always	make	this	assumption	for	all	the	analytic	 derivations.	 In	 particular,	 under	 this	 hypothesis,	 the	 opposition	 party	 proposals,	which	finally	get	to	be	approved	with	the	contribution	of	the	majority,	will	be	all	the	positive	ones.	We	will	analyse	in	detail	this	situation	in	the	next	section.			 		 								 Figure	3.	Asymptotic	distributions	of	both	parties	after	averaging	over	many	terms	(NL>>1).	The	contribution	of	the	opposition	party	P2	to	the	expected	percentage	of	accepted	proposals	is	now	represented	by	the	positive	side	(in	dark	blue)	of	the	corresponding	asymptotic	distribution.		Let	us	define,	now,	the	global	efficiency	Eff	(L)	of	a	term.	It	will	be	given	by	the	net	social	gain	yielded	 by	 the	 accepted	 proposals,	 i.e.	 by	 the	 product	 of	 the	 percentage	 N%ACC	 (L)	 of	 the	accepted	 proposals	 (calculated	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 total	 number	 of	 proposals	 put	 forward	during	the	term)	times	their	average	social	gain	YAV	(L):			 	 	 	 	 		𝐸𝑓𝑓	(𝐿) = 𝑁%,--(𝐿) 	 ∙ 𝑌,0(𝐿)		 										 																					(1)																																																												Averaging	over	NL	terms,	one	can	obtain	the	expected	global	efficiency:			
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	 	 	 	 	 		𝐸𝑓𝑓123 = 456 ∑ 𝐸𝑓𝑓(𝐿)56894 		 				 																																				(2)		 	Defining	N%ACC	 as	 the	 expected	 percentage	 of	 accepted	 proposals	 and	YAV	 as	 their	 expected	social	gain,	both	averaged	over	the	NL	terms:																						𝑁%,-- = 456 ∑ 𝑁%,--(𝐿)56894 																						𝑌,0 = 456 ∑ 𝑌,0(𝐿)56894 		one	can	also	expect	that,	in	the	limit	NL>>1:	 		 	 	 															 					𝐸𝑓𝑓123 ≅ 	𝑁%,-- ∙ 𝑌,0 		 				 																																	(3)																								The	expected	global	efficiency	is	the	fundamental	measure	of	the	efficiency	of	a	deliberative	body	 like	a	parliament.	 In	 the	 following	we	shall	develop	 this	notion	much	 further	with	 the	purpose	 of	 investigating	 the	 effects	 on	 such	 a	 measure	 of	 a	 variable	 composition	 of	parliament.	 In	particular,	we	shall	 address	 the	question	of	what	would	happen	 if	 a	variable	percentage	of	members	of	parliament	had	no	longer	an	obligation	of	following	the	party	line,	simply	because	they	do	not	belong	to	any	party.	For	this	reason,	these	legislators	will	be	called	“independent”.	 At	 variance	 with	 legislators	 elected	 as	 members	 of	 a	 party,12	independent	legislators	might	be	assumed	to	be	drawn	randomly	from	the	population	of	constituents.	The	whole	purpose	of	this	paper	is	precisely	to	show	how	the	expected	global	efficiency	changes	as	parliament	allows	a	given	number	Nind	of	randomly	selected	independent	members	in,	free	of	any	party	discipline.				
4.	Expected	global	efficiency	for	the	two	polar	cases:	Nind	=	0	and	Nind	=	N			In	 this	 section	 we	 will	 show	 how	 to	 derive	 analytically	 the	 proposed	 measure	 of	parliamentary	 efficiency	 in	 the	 limit	 of	 many	 legislators	 (N>>1)	 and	 many	 parliamentary	terms	(NL>>1).	These	limits	will	allow	us	to	consider	Gaussian	distributions	of	legislators	and	to	 substitute	 integrals	 to	 the	 summations	 for	 calculating	 the	 averages	 of	 the	 various	quantities.	For	the	time	being,	 the	derivation	will	concern	the	two	polar	cases:	a	parliament	with	 just	 two	parties,	 i.e.	 with	Nind	 =	 0	 independent	 legislators,	 and	 a	 parliament	 with	 just	
randomly	selected	members,	i.e.	with	Nind	=	N.			
A	Parliament	with	only	two	parties	(60%-40%)	To	determine	the	global	efficiency	in	the	case	of	a	parliament	with	a	majority	party	P1	with	60	per	cent	of	members	and	an	opposition	party	P2	with	40	per	cent,	we	proceed	by	evaluating	separately	 the	 two	 factors	 in	Equation	3.	 In	accordance	with	 the	assumption	NL>>1,	 for	 the	Gaussian	distributions	of	the	two	parties	we	assume	that	<Y1>=<Y2>=0.	We	also	assume	the	same	 standard	 deviation	 𝜎=0.15.	 Because	 of	 the	 previously	 illustrated	 voting	 rules	 and	recalling	that	the	percentage	of	proposals	coming	from	the	members	of	a	party	is	equal	to	the	percentage	of	 legislators	of	that	party,	the	expected	percentage	of	accepted	proposals	N%ACC,	averaged	 over	 many	 parliamentary	 terms,	 is	 given	 by	 the	 sum	 of	 two	 elements	 (consider	again	Figure	3	as	reference):	the	first	one,	which	is	the	contribution	of	party	P1,	is	represented	by	 the	whole	 area	below	 the	corresponding	asymptotic	distribution	P1(Y),	while	 the	second																																																									12	As	a	matter	of	fact	no	electoral	system	is	explicitly	assumed	in	the	paper.	The	particular	distribution	of	party	members	however	is	an	indication	that	those	members	of	parliament	are	not	randomly	selected.		
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one,	 the	 contribution	of	 party	P2,	 is	 represented	only	 by	 the	 (dark)	 area	below	 the	positive	part	 of	 the	 corresponding	 asymptotic	 distribution	 P2(Y),	 since	 –	 as	 already	 shown	 in	 the	previous	section	–	the	positive	proposals	coming	from	the	opposition	party	are	the	only	ones	voted	also	from	the	majority	party.		 	As	shown	in	Appendix	A,	in	this	case	the	expected	global	efficiency	over	many	parliamentary	terms	will	be:		 	 	 								𝐸𝑓𝑓123 = 	𝑁%,-- ∙ 𝑌,0 = 80(%) ∙ 0.06 = 4.8	%																																				(4)		It	is	not	surprising	that	we	get	such	a	very	small	value.	The	only	positive	contribution	to	social	welfare	comes	from	the	opposition	party	that,	thanks	to	the	support	of	the	majority	party,	will	see	its	positive	proposals	approved	with	a	 large	majority.	 It	may	sound	paradoxical	that	the	majority	 party	 is	 capable	 of	 giving	 rise	 to	 a	 positive	 social	 gain	 only	 when	 other	 parties’	proposals	 are	 at	 stake.	 We	 will	 see	 later	 that	 this	 value	 can	 be	 increased	 if	 different	circumstances	apply.	 In	particular,	we	shall	 look	at	 the	possibility	of	 filling	parliament	with	independent	legislators,	free	from	any	party	linkage.			This	could	be	realized	in	practice	by	selecting	them	at	random	from	all	the	citizens	with	the	necessary	requirements	(in	principle,	the	same	that	allow	them	to	express	their	preferences	for	 the	parties	during	 the	elections).	Because	of	 this	particular	 selection	procedure,	we	will	assume	that	the	independent	legislators	are	not	subject	to	any	kind	of	party	discipline:	each	of	them	 votes	 independently	 from	 the	 other	 independent	 legislators	 and	 from	 the	 parties.	 In	particular,	given	a	proposal	p*	with	abscissa	Y*,	any	independent	member	Ak	with	abscissa	Yk	will	 accept	 it	 only	 if	 Y*>	 Yk,	 since	 Yk	 represents	 the	minimum	 social	 gain	 that	 the	 proposal	should	yield	for	it	to	be	accepted	by	Ak.	Again,	as	already	seen	for	the	parties’	vote,	for	a	given	proposal	p*,	we	assume	that,	because	of	internal	motivations	(personal	interests),	only	50%	of	the	independent	legislators	fulfilling	the	condition	Yk	<	Y*	will	accept	the	proposal.	
	
A	Parliament	with	only	independent	legislators	
	Let	 us	 now	 consider	 the	 extreme	 case	 of	 an	 entirely	 independent	 parliament,	 that	 is	 a	parliament	with	 only	 independent	 legislators	 (Nind	=	N).	We	 assume	 that,	 in	 the	 limit	N>>1,	their	 probability	 distribution	 P(Y)	 along	 the	 Y-axis	 is	 a	 uniform	 one	 (from	 -1	 to	 +1)	 with	unitary	area	(see	Figure	4).	Due	to	this	latter	requirement,	we	will	have	P(Y)=1/2.			 				 					 Figure	4.	Uniform	distribution	of	independent	legislators		We	know	that	the	main	feature	of	independent	legislators	is	that	they	are	not	subjected	to	any	party	discipline.	This,	 in	principle,	brings	 into	 the	parliament	a	positive	element,	 since	each	proposal	needs	 to	be	 largely	discussed	 to	 reach	 the	 consensus	of	 the	majority	 (N/2	+	1)	of	legislators.	However,	in	such	circumstances	(since	an	average	over	many	parliamentary	terms	
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is	 considered),	 none	 of	 the	 proposals	 will	 be	 accepted.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 quite	 clear	 that	 only	proposals	with	a	positive	abscissa	Y*	could	have	a	chance	to	be	accepted,	since	the	required	majority	 could	 be	 reached	 only	 for	 those	 proposals	 (see	 dark	 area	 in	 Figure	 4).	 However,	because	of	their	personal	interests,	we	know	that	only	one	half	of	the	independent	legislators	with	Yk	<	Y*	will	accept	these	proposals.	Therefore,	to	reach	N/2	+	1	votes,	a	given	proposal	should	have	an	abscissa	Y*	not	only	greater	than	zero	but	also	greater	than	1.		In	conclusion,	for	a	hypothetical	parliament	with	only	independent	legislators,	we	will	always	find	a	null	result	for	the	expected	values	of	both	the	percentage	of	accepted	proposals	and	the	average	social	gain.	This	means	that	the	expected	global	efficiency	over	many	terms	will	be:		 																																																												𝐸𝑓𝑓123 = 	𝑁%,-- ∙ 𝑌,0 = 0																																																(5)		This	 unexpected	 result	makes	 party	 discipline	 not	 so	 difficult	 to	 accept,	 especially	when	 it	makes	good	proposals	(i.e.	with	a	positive	value	of	social	gain)	easier	to	accept.	But	certainly	not	 when	 it	 is	 designed	 to	 impose	 the	 dictatorship	 of	 the	 majority.	 As	 argued	 above,	 in	 a	parliament	without	parties,	none	of	the	proposals	has	enough	votes	to	get	approved,	since	no	proposal	 is	 good	 enough	 for	 half	 of	 the	 legislators.	 This	 result	mirrors	 that	 arising	 from	 a	parliament	with	only	parties,	where	hardly	any	positive	contribution	to	social	welfare	is	likely	on	average	to	emerge.			However,	it	has	certainly	not	gone	unnoticed	that	the	very	small	efficiency	associated	to	both	illustrated	cases	-	a	parliament	with	only	parties	and	one	with	only	independent	legislators	-	depends	 on	 opposite	 reasons.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 parliament	with	 parties	many	 proposals	 get	accepted,	but	they	yield	a	very	small	average	social	gain.	In	the	case	of	a	parliament	with	only	independent	legislators,	parliament	accepts	only	extremely	good	proposals,	but	their	number	is	close	 to	zero.	Therefore,	we	can	expect	 that	contaminating	a	parliament	with	 two	parties	with	an	increasing	number	of	independent	legislators	would	reduces	the	number	of	accepted	proposals	while	increasing	their	average	social	gain	(at	least	until	the	percentage	of	accepted	proposals	 is	 greater	 than	 zero).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 value	 of	 the	 global	 efficiency	 as	 a	function	of	 the	percentage	of	 independents	 sneaking	 into	parliament,	 calculated	 as	product	point	by	point	of	 the	previous	two	quantities,	should	show	an	 initial	 increase	 from	its	quite	low	 extreme	 value	 typical	 of	 the	 two-party	 case,	 then	 it	 should	 reach	 a	 central	 peak	 in	correspondence	 of	 a	 given	 percentage	 of	 uniformly	 distributed	 independents,	 and	 finally	 it	should	 slip	 towards	 zero,	when	 the	 percentage	 of	 independents	 approaches	 a	 hundred	 per	cent.	In	the	following	section	we	will	provide	a	demonstration	that	this	is	roughly	the	case.			
5.	A	parliament	with	an	increasing	number	of	independent	members		Let	us	start	with	the	analytic	derivation	of	the	percentage	of	accepted	proposals	as	function	of	the	number	of	 independents,	 in	 a	parliament	with	N>>1	members	 and	 in	 the	 limit	 of	many	legislative	 terms.	 Just	as	an	example,	we	will	 consider	a	parliament	with	N	=	500	members,	but	of	course	our	results	are	valid	for	any	(great)	value	of	N.	It	is	worth	noticing	that,	with	Nind	independent	legislators,	the	real	number	of	members	belonging	to	the	two	parties,	P1	and	P2,	has	to	be	calculated	by	taking,	respectively,	60	per	cent	and	40	per	cent	of	the	difference	N	–	
Nind.	 This	 means	 that,	 above	 a	 given	 threshold	 of	 Nind,	 P1	will	 no	 longer	 be	 the	 absolute	majority	party	but	only	the	relative	majority	one.	We	will	see	that	it	is	precisely	this	feature,	together	with	 the	role	of	 the	 independent	 legislators	 that	makes	enhancing	 the	efficiency	of	the	parliament	possible.	
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	As	 we	 know,	 in	 the	 limit	 of	 many	 legislative	 terms,	 both	 parties	 are	 centred	 at	 Y=0,	 thus	positive	proposals	(i.e.	proposals	with	Y*	>	0),	which	represent	the	50%	of	the	total	number,	are	 accepted	 by	 100	 per	 cent	 of	 the	members	 of	 the	 party	 proposing	 them	 (through	 party	discipline)	 and	 by	 50	 per	 cent	 of	 the	members	 of	 the	 other	 party	 (due	 to	 the	 influence	 of	personal	interests).	Furthermore,	in	principle,	these	proposals	should	be	accepted	also	by	one	half	of	the	independent	legislators	with	abscissa	Y	<	0.	But,	from	the	independent	legislators	point	 of	 view,	 the	 average	 social	 gain	 of	 the	 positive	 proposals	 is	 not	 Y=0	 but	 Y=0.5	 (the	middle	 point	 of	 the	 positive	 part	 of	 the	 Y	 axis).	 One	 can	 easily	 notice	 that	 some	proposals,	lying	on	the	positive	axis,	will	be	voted	by	independent	legislators	having	an	abscissa	higher	than	zero.	Therefore,	one	half	of	the	independent	ones	with	-1	<	Y	<	0.5	will	vote,	on	average,	for	positive	proposals:	this	means	that,	since	they	are	uniformly	distributed	along	the	Y	axis,	a	percentage	 of	 37,5%	 of	 independent	 legislators	 will	 accept	 these	 proposals	 (as	 shown	 in	Figure	5).														 		 		Figure	 5.	 Percentage	 of	 independent	 legislators	 voting,	 on	 average	 and	 in	 the	 limit	 of	 many	legislative	terms,	for	the	positive	proposals	coming	from	the	parties		Pooling	 together	 the	 three	 contributions	 of	 the	 majority	 party,	 the	 opposition	 party	 and	independent	legislators,	we	can	easily	work	out	the	number	of	votes	received,	on	average,	by	the	 positive	 proposals	 coming	 from	 the	 legislators,	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 percentage	 of	independent	legislators	sitting	in	parliament.	The	results	are	shown	in	Figure	6.			Looking	at	the	details	of	the	plot,	where	the	example	of	a	parliament	with	N=500	members	is	considered,	one	can	notice	that:	
• positive	proposals	coming	from	independent	legislators	are	never	accepted,	since	they	never	reach	the	threshold	of		N/2	+	1	=	251	votes	(indicated	by	the	horizontal	line);			
• positive	proposals	 coming	 from	 the	 relative	minority	party	P2	 are	 accepted	until	 the	percentage	of	independent	legislators	in	the	parliament	stays	below	61	per	cent;	
• positive	proposals	 coming	 from	 the	 relative	majority	party	P1	 are	 accepted	until	 the	percentage	of	independent	legislators	in	the	parliament	stays	below	70	per	cent.	
• 					 	
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														 Figure	6.	Number	of	votes	received,	on	average,	by	both	the	positive	and	the	negative	proposals	coming	 from	 the	 three	 component	 of	 the	 parliament,	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 percentage	 of	independent	legislators.	The	absolute	majority	level	is	also	reported	as	a	horizontal	line.	Along	this	 line,	 three	 thresholds	 are	 visible,	 under	which	 the	 corresponding	 proposals	 do	 not	 reach	enough	votes	to	get	passed.		In	the	same	Figure,	negative	proposals	have	been	also	considered	(i.e.	proposals	with	Y*	<	0).	It	 is	straightforward	to	notice	(and	 it	 is	confirmed	by	the	plot)	 that	only	those	coming	from	the	 relative	 majority	 party	 P1	 can	 be	 accepted,	 until	 this	 party	 maintains	 the	 absolute	majority,	since	its	members	accept	both	good	and	bad	proposals	because	of	party	discipline.	Negative	proposals	coming	from	P2	and	independent	legislators	are	never	accepted.	When	P1	loses	 the	absolute	majority,	 its	negative	proposals	 (on	average)	can	still	be	accepted	due	 to	the	contribution	of	one	half	of	independent	legislators	with	-1	<	Y	<	-0.5	(who	represent	the	12,5%	of	the	total,	see	Figure	7),	being	Y	=	-0.5	the	average	social	gain	of	negative	proposals	coming	 from	 P1.	 This	 happens	 until	 the	 percentage	 of	 independent	 legislators	 in	 the	parliament	 stays	 below	 21	 per	 cent.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 notice	 that	 neither	 positive	 nor	negative	 proposals	 coming	 from	 independent	 legislators	 can	 be	 accepted,	 no	 matter	 how	many	of	them	sit	in	parliament.				 											Figure	7:	Percentage	of	independent	legislators	voting,	on	average	and	in	the	limit	of	many	legislative	terms,	for	the	negative	proposals	coming	from	the	parties.		Summarizing,	in	Figure	6	we	saw	that	three	progressive	thresholds	thAB,	thBC	and	thCD	do	exist,	identifying	four	different	intervals	in	the	percentage	of	independent	legislators,	namely	A,	B,	C	and	D,	each	one	with	a	given	(decreasing)	percentage	of	accepted	proposals.	Quite	clearly,	the	
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values	of	these	thresholds	strictly	depend	on	the	size	p	of	the	relative	majority	party	P1.	In	the	case	considered,	 i.e.	 for	p	=	60	per	cent,	we	already	found	(empirically)	thAB=21%	thBC=61%	and	thCD=70%.	The	expressions	of	these	thresholds	for	any	value	of	p	and	any	value	of	N	have	been	analytically	determined	in	Appendix	B.							Having	a	look	at	the	behaviour	of	thAB,	thBC,	thCD	as	function	of	p	for	N=500,	reported	in	Figure	8,	the	four	regions	A,	B,	C	and	D	are	well	defined	in	a	plausible	range	of	values	of	p,	going	from	51%	to	80%.	On	the	other	hand,	for	p	>	80%	the	region	B	would	disappear,	but	the	values	of	p	would	be	unrealistic:	 in	 fact,	also	with	randomly	selected	 legislators,	 the	relative	size	of	 the	two	 parties	 in	 the	 real	 world	 should	 continue	 to	 be	 decided	 by	 elections	 results	 (in	 this	respect	 we	 imagine	 a	 mixed	 electoral	 system),	 and	 it	 is	 very	 unlikely	 that	 any	 party	 or	coalition	obtains	more	than	60-65%	of	preferences.			 														 		Figure	 8.	 Behaviour	 of	 the	 three	 thresholds	 thAB,	 thBC,	 thCD	as	 function	 of	 p	 for	 N=500.	 The	particular	case	of	p=60%	is	reported	as	a	dashed	vertical	line.		
	At	this	point,	within	each	one	of	these	four	regions,	we	can	analytically	work	out,	in	the	limit	of	many	legislative	terms,	the	percentage	of	accepted	proposals	N%ACC	and	the	average	value	of	the	 social	 gain	 YAV	 produced	 by	 these	 proposals,	 both	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 number	 of	independent	legislators	Nind.	Details	of	this	derivation	are	in	Appendix	C.					
6.	Searching	for	the	maximum	efficiency				We	are	now	ready	to	calculate	the	expected	average	global	efficiency	Effexp	of	our	parliament	as	a	function	of	p,	N	and	Nind,	in	the	four	regions	A,	B,	C	and	D,	by	multiplying	inside	each	of	them	 the	 value	 of	 N%ACC	 (Appendix	 C,	 Equations	 1-4)	 for	 the	 corresponding	 value	 of	 YAV	(Appendix	 C,	 Equations	 5-8).	 Details	 of	 the	 calculations	 are	 in	 Appendix	 D.	 Let	 us	 present,	here,	the	plots	of	these	efficiency	functions	into	each	region.		In	Figure	9	we	plot	the	efficiency	EffA	(Appendix	D,	Equation	2)	as	function	of	Nind/N		for	three	increasing	values	of	p	from	51%	to	70%.	We	observe	that,	within	its	maximum	possible	range	(i.e.	between	0	and	thAB(max)=43%,	i.e.	for	0	<	Nind/N	<	0.43),	it	is	a	monotonically	increasing	function	(as	also	confirmed	by	the	derivative	plot	in	the	inset):		
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	 									 	 		Figure	9:	Behaviour	of	the	efficiency	EffA	as	function	of	Nind/N		 for	three	increasing	values	of	p.	The	derivative	of	EffA	is	plotted	in	the	inset	and	it	is	always	positive	in	the	same	interval	for	any	
p.		In	Figure	10	we	plot	the	efficiency	EffB	(Appendix	D,	Equation	3)	as	function	of	Nind/N,	which	does	not	depend	on	p.	We	observe	 that,	 in	 its	maximum	possible	 range	 (i.e.	between	0	and	
thBC(max)=65%),	it	has	always	a	maximum.			 										 	 	Figure	10.	Behaviour	of	the	efficiency	EffB	as	function	of	Nind/N		for	any	value	of	p.	The	derivative	of	EffB	is	plotted	in	the	inset	and	the	position	of	the	maximum	is	visible.		The	value	of	the	maximum	(Nind	=	34%,	see	Appendix	D)	ensures	that	it	remains	in	region	B	until	the	size	p	of	the	majority	party	stays	below	70%	(above	this	size,	as	visible	in	Figure	8,	region	B	becomes	too	smaller).				Plotting	in	Figure	11	the	efficiency	EffC	(Appendix	D,	Equation	4)	as	function	of	Nind/N	for	the	same	three	values	of	p	considered	in	Figure	10,	we	notice	that,	in	its	maximum	possible	range	(i.e.	between	thAB(max)=43%	and	thCD(max)=76%),	it	is	a	monotonically	decreasing	function,	as	also	confirmed	by	its	derivative	plotted	in	the	inset	(see	Appendix	D).					 		
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													 Figure	11.	Behaviour	of	the	efficiency	EffC	as	function	of	Nind/N		for	three	increasing	values	of	p.	The	derivative	of	EffC	is	also	plotted	in	the	inset	and	it	is	always	negative	in	the	same	interval	for	any	p.		Summing	up	so	far,	the	behaviour	of	the	average	global	efficiency	in	the	three	regions	A,	B	and	C,	where	it	assumes	non	null	values,	seems	consistent	with	the	hypothesis	that	this	efficiency	has	a	minimum	at	the	two	extrema	(Nind=0	and	Nind=N),	starts	to	monotonically	increase	for	small	 values	 of	 Nind	 (region	 A),	 reaches	 a	 maximum	 for	 Nind/N=0.34	 (region	 B),	 then	monotonically	decreases	 towards	zero	(region	C).	From	there	on,	 in	region	D,	 the	efficiency	
EffD	remains	equal	to	zero	(see	Appendix	D,	Equation	5).			Let	us	now	look	into	this	scenario	in	greater	detail,	and	plot	in	Figure	12	the	average	global	efficiency	in	the	range	0	<	Nind	<	thCD(max)	for	four	increasing	values	of	p.	The	positions	of	the	three	 thresholds	 thAB,	thBC	and	thCD	 that	 separate	 the	 four	 regions	 are	 indicated	 by	 vertical	dashed	 lines.	Of	 course,	 the	 sudden	 change	 in	 efficiency	 observed	 in	 all	 the	plots	when	 the	value	of	Nind/N	crosses	each	one	of	the	three	thresholds,	 is	an	effect	of	 the	assumed	limit	of	many	 (infinite)	 legislative	 terms.	 Averaging	 over	 a	 relatively	 small	 number	 of	 them,	 the	fluctuations	mainly	 due	 to	 the	 random	positions	 of	 the	 two	 parties	 along	 the	 Y	 axis	would	make	these	transitions	much	smoother.		By	looking	closely	at	the	four	panels,	it	clearly	appears	that	the	position	of	the	maximum	value	for	the	global	efficiency,	say	Effmax,	is	not	always	situated	in	region	B	but	strictly	depends	on	the	value	of	p.	As	is	visible	in	panels	(a)	and	(b),	the	initial	insertion	of	independent	legislators	in	a	parliament	with	only	parties	induces	a	sudden	increase	in	the	global	efficiency,	similar	for	any	 value	 of	 p,	which	 reaches	 its	maximum	value	Effmax(A)	 at	 the	 threshold	 thAB.	However,	since	the	position	of	 this	 threshold	does	depend	on	p,	 for	 intermediate	values	of	Nind	 it	may	occur	that,	as	shown	in	panels	(c)	and	(d),	the	value	Effmax(A)	exceeds	the	maximum	value	of	the	efficiency	in	region	B,	Effmax(B).										 		
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												 								 Figure	12.	 The	 average	 global	 efficiency	 in	 the	 range	0	<	Nind	<	 thCD(max)	 is	 plotted	 for	 four	 increasing	values	of	p,	i.e.:	51%	(a),	55%	(b),	60%	(c)	and	70%	(d).			Following	these	insights,	 in	Figure	13	we	plot,	as	dashed	lines,	both	the	constant	position	of	the	 absolute	 maximum	 for	 Effmax(B)	 (34%	 of	 independent	 legislators)	 and	 the	 variable	position	 of	 the	 threshold	 thAB,	 also	 expressed	 as	 percentage	 of	 the	 independent	 legislators.	Then,	in	bold,	we	highlight	the	position	of	the	global	maximum	efficiency	Effmax(p).	We	found	that,	until	p	<	56.5	(%),	 it	results	Effmax(B)	=	8.22	>	Effmax(A),	 therefore	Effmax(p)	=	Effmax(B).	However,	 for	 p	 >	 56.5	 (%),	 Effmax(A)	 starts	 to	 exceed	 8.22,	 thus	 becoming	 the	 new	 global	maximum	efficiency	Effmax(p).	This	implies	that	at	p	=	56.5	(%)	the	percentage	of	independent	legislators	needed	to	get	the	maximum	efficiency	suddenly	rushes	down	from	34%	to	14.3%,	then	it	slowly	goes	back	towards	34%,	reached	again	around	p	=	70	(%),	where	region	B	tends	to	disappear	and	the	maximum	efficiency	reaches	its	highest	value	Effmax	(A)	=11.8.			 					 									Figure	13.	The	position	of	the	absolute	maximum	for	Effmax(B)	and	the	variable	position	of	the	threshold	thAB	=	
Effmax(A)	 are	 plotted	 as	 dashed	 lines.	 In	 bold,	 partially	 superimposed	 to	 the	 previous	 lines,	 we	 indicate	 the	position	of	the	global	maximum	efficiency	Effmax(p).	
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	In	conclusion,	 the	analysis	of	 the	parliament	 in	 the	 limit	of	many	 legislative	 terms	confirms	that	 an	 intermediate	 percentage	N%ind	 (between	 14%	 and	 34%)	 of	 legislators	 independent	from	the	two	parties	and	not	subject	to	any	party	discipline,	can	always	improve	the	efficiency	of	 the	 system,	 regardless	 of	 the	 size	 of	 the	 relative	 majority	 party.	 This	 general	 analytical	result	is	in	full	agreement	with	our	previous	findings,	obtained	through	a	computational	study	of	the	2D	model	of	parliament,	where	both	a	variable	relative	size	 for	the	two	parties	and	a	variable	percentage	of	independent	legislators	were	considered	[A.	Pluchino	et	al.,	2011]	and	suggests	a	possible	policy	for	effectively	increasing	parliamentary	efficiency.			
7.	Repairing	the	fallacy	of	representative	democracy		Representative	 democracy,	 when	 based	 on	 the	 party	 system,	 fails	 to	 deliver	 its	 most	important	 outcome,	 i.e.	 an	 efficient	 bundle	 of	 acts	 of	 legislation.	 This	 is	 especially	 the	 case	when	the	majority	representation	system	is	adopted.	In	this	case,	there	is	always	a	party	in	a	position	to	command	an	absolute	majority	in	parliament.	This	system	is	usually	advocated	as	a	system	capable	of	delivering	decisions,	thus	denying	any	serious	fallacy	and	arguing	that	the	ability	of	taking	decisions	makes	up	for	the	failings	of	representation	and	party	discipline.	In	fact,	 one	 can	 improve	 upon	 that	 outcome.	 This	 paper	 was	 designed	 to	 show	 that	 this	 is	possible	when	independent	legislators,	randomly	selected	from	the	relevant	constituency,	are	allowed	to	sit	in	parliament	without	any	obligation	to	join	a	party	and	accept	its	discipline.			The	main	argument	was	based	upon	 the	 costs	a	 representative	democracy	 typically	entails.	Those	 costs	 emerge	 from	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 constituents	 and	 political	representatives.	It	typically	happens	that	political	representatives	cease	to	be	faithful	agents	of	 their	 constituents	 and	 turn	 into	 agents	 of	 their	 parties.	 This	 is	 what	 we	 have	 called	factionalism.	 As	 extensively	 illustrated	 in	 the	 paper,	 this	 shift	 in	 the	 agency	 relationship	deprives	 the	 representative	 system	of	 its	 ability	 to	 deliver	 decisions	 that	 command	 a	 large	consensus	 in	 the	 population	 of	 constituents.	 For	 one	 can	 expect	 that	 the	 system	 delivers	unpopular	 decisions	 just	 as	 easily	 as	 it	 can	 deliver	 popular	 ones.	 	 Its	 cost,	 therefore,	 is	 the	forgone	benefit	of	not	delivering	just	popular	decisions.			It	has	been	argued	in	the	paper	that	there	is	a	way	to	repair	this	fallacy	and	minimize	the	cost	of	representative	democracy.	The	logic	underlying	this	endeavour	is	preserving	the	ability	of	representative	democracy	to	deliver	decisions	while	increasing	as	much	as	possible	their	net	contribution	to	welfare.	The	way	to	do	so	is	shifting	the	balance	of	decision	making	towards	the	 positive	 side.	 Letting	 a	 number	 of	 independent	 legislators,	 drawn	 at	 random	 among	common	citizens,	sitting	in	parliament	with	the	same	prerogatives	of	the	other	legislators,	has	an	outstanding	advantage:	it	allows	in	parliament	legislators	who	will	vote	only	for	acts	that	meet	their	personal	threshold.	This	is	a	major	improvement	in	a	system	where	legislators,	due	to	party	discipline,	vote	also	for	acts	they	do	not	 like.	By	gradually	allowing	more	and	more	independent	legislators	in	parliament,	the	detrimental	effects	of	party	discipline	are	curtailed	and	the	beneficial	effects	of	voting	according	to	one’s	preferences	are	enlarged.	There	comes	a	point	where	the	ability	of	a	party	to	make	its	members	vote	for	whatever	comes	from	within	loses	its	strength,	thus	magnifying	the	role	of	those	legislators	who	are	not	subjected	to	any	imposition.	 However,	 one	 should	 not	 think	 that	 the	 larger	 the	 number	 of	 independent	legislators,	the	better.	Party	discipline	has	its	merits	and	should	not	be	discarded	altogether.	As	 extensively	 shown	 in	 the	 previous	 sections,	 if	 only	 independent	 legislators	 sat	 in	parliament	 hardly	 any	 decision	 would	 be	 taken,	 whether	 good	 or	 bad.	 The	 model	 of	
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parliament	illustrated	in	this	paper	has	precisely	shown	that	a	virtuous	combination	of	party	discipline	and	freedom	of	choice	is	possible.			Implementing	a	mixed	parliament	is	not	impossible.	For	example,	the	number	of	independent	legislators	to	be	introduced	in	the	parliament	could	be	linked	to	the	level	of	abstention	in	the	election	(in	the	2014	European	elections	the	abstention	area	was	by	far	the	first	party,	with	a	57%	 of	 non	 voters,	 but	 a	 typical	 percentage	 in	 almost	 all	 modern	 democracies	 is	 around	30%).	Our	proposal	may	provide	an	option	to	those	constituents	who	are	typically	oriented	towards	 abstention:	 each	 of	 them,	 going	 to	 the	 polls	 during	 the	 election	 day,	 could	 choose	whether	to	vote	for	a	party	candidate	or	enrol	in	a	list	for	a	sortition.	Then,	after	the	elections,	a	percentage	of	seats	proportional	to	the	area	of	abstention	would	be	reserved	to	randomly	selected	citizens	picked	out	from	the	list	of	candidates.	Of	course	the	remaining	seats	would	be	assigned	to	candidates	of	the	parties	in	a	proportion	established	through	voting.			It	is	likely	that	such	a	procedure	will	give	rise	to	a	parliament	without	any	absolute	majority,	and	this	could	be	considered	dangerous	in	parliamentary	systems,	since	it	could	make	difficult	to	have	a	stable	Government	(which	is	usually	expressed	by	the	absolute	majority).	But,	as	we	show	in	the	paper,	the	absence	of	an	absolute	majority,	because	of	independent	legislators,	is	precisely	what	improves	the	efficiency	of	the	parliament.	Finally,	to	protect	the	independent	legislators	 from	 being	 captured	 by	 the	 existing	 parties,	 we	 could	 also	 think	 of	 a	 system	 of	rotation,	so	that	new	independent	legislators	would	be	selected	at	random	(from	the	original	sortition	list	decided	by	the	abstention	level)	for	each	single	parliamentary	session,	devoted	to	a	specific	issue.			
	
8.	Concluding	remarks		The	purpose	of	this	paper	was	to	show	that	sortition	can	help	reduce	the	detrimental	effects	of	 factionalism.	 In	 the	paper	 those	detrimental	 effects,	which	 emerge	 from	party	discipline,	are	 foregone	 benefits.	 When	 two	 or	 more	 parties	 sit	 in	 a	 parliament,	 party	 discipline	 on	average	 generates	 grossly	 inefficient	 results,	 as	 good	decisions	 tend	 to	be	 cancelled	by	bad	decisions.	 If,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 a	 number	 of	 members	 of	 parliament	 sorted	 by	 lot	 are	introduced,	party	discipline	does	not	spread	across	parliament	and	that	null	average	can	be	turned	 into	 a	 positive	 outcome.	 The	 paper	 shows	 that	 there	 are	 thresholds	 beyond	 which	improvements	are	no	longer	possible.	That	is	the	ideal	state	of	affairs.	Just	like	in	old	Italian	city-states	 when	 sortition	 could	 be	 effectively	 combined	 with	 more	 traditional	 ways	 of	selecting	public	officers,	nowadays	sortition	could	be	combined	with	party	systems	 to	 tame	the	undesirable	implications	of	factionalism.			 		 	
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APPENDIX	A	
	Here	follows	the	formal	expression:			 																																				where	the	two	contributions	are	weigthted	according	to	the	percentage	of	proposals	put	forward	by	each	party,	in	this	case	equal	to	its	relative	size.	Since	both	the	distributions	are	normalized,	 i.e.	 their	 total	area	 is	equal	 to	1,	 the	expected	value	 for	N%ACC	over	 the	entire	set	of	NL	terms	will	be:		 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 											 	 	 	 											 In	 the	 same	 fashion,	 the	 expected	 average	 social	 gain	YAV	 of	 these	 proposals	 over	 the	same	set	of	parliamentary	terms	is	given,	again,	by	the	sum	of	two	elements,	stemming	from	 the	 contributions	 of	 P1	 and	 P2	 (in	 terms	 of	 fraction	 of	 proposals	 submitted	multiplied	by	their	welfare	contribution)				 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 											 The	first	integral	gives	a	null	result	since,	because	of	party	discipline,	the	majority	party	accepts	all	its	internal	proposals,	regardless	of	their	contribution	(positive	or	negative)	to	 the	 social	 gain;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 second	 integral	 is	 calculated	 only	 over	 the	positive	Y-axis,	therefore	it	gives	a	small	positive	result:			 	 	 	 	 	 											Therefore,	the	expected	global	efficiency	over	many	parliamentary	terms	will	be:				 	 	 								𝐸𝑓𝑓123 = 	𝑁%,-- ∙ 𝑌,0 = 80(%) ∙ 0.06 = 4.8	%																																						
	
APPENDIX	B	
	 The	first	threshold	thAB(p)	will	be	obtained	by	imposing	the	condition	that	the	number	of	 votes	 for	 the	 negative	 proposals	 of	 the	majority	 party	 P1	(due,	 as	we	 know,	 to	 the	contribution	of	P1	itself	and	of	12,5%	of	independent	legislators)	is	equal	to	N/2	+	1,	i.e.:				 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 										 	Solving	with	respect	to	Nind,	we	have:										 Then,	 dividing	 by	 N	 and	 multiplying	 by	 100,	 we	 obtain	 the	 threshold	 value	 in	percentage:					 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 							
N%ACC = P1(Y )dY
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For	N=500	and	p=60	we	have,	as	expected,	thAB=21%	(corresponding	to	Nind=103).		In	a	similar	way,	the	second	threshold	thBC(p)	will	be	obtained	by	imposing	the	condition	that	the	number	of	votes	for	the	positive	proposals	of	the	relative	minority	party	P2	(due	to	the	contribution	of	all	members	of	P2	,	one	half	of	P1	and	of	37.5%	of	independents)	is	equal	to	N/2	+	1,	i.e.:				 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 											 Going	on	as	in	the	previous	case,	after	some	algebra	we	obtain:					 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 										 that,	for	N=500	and	p=60,	gives,	as	expected,	thBC=61%	(corresponding	to	Nind=305).		 Finally,	 the	 third	 threshold	 thCD(p)	can	be	obtained	by	 imposing	 the	condition	 that	 the	number	 of	 votes	 for	 the	 positive	 proposals	 of	 the	 majority	 party	 P1	 (due	 to	 the	contribution	of	all	members	of	P1	,	one	half	of	P2	and	of	37.5%	of	independents)		is	equal	to	N/2	+	1,	i.e.:					 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 									 	Going	on	as	in	the	two	previous	cases,	we	obtain:					 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 						 	that,	for	N=500	and	p=60,	gives,	as	expected,	thBC=70%	(corresponding	to	Nind=350).	
	
	
APPENDIX	C	
	 Let	us	first	derive,	for	each	one	of	the	four	regions	A,	B,	C	and	D	addressed	in	section4,	the	 percentage	 of	 accepted	 proposals	 N%ACC	 	 adds	 a	 function	 of	 the	 number	 of	independent	legislators	Nind:			 A. In	 this	 region,	N%ACC	is	 the	 sum	 of	 three	 terms,	 one	 due	 to	 the	 contribution	 of	 the	positive	 proposals	 of	 the	 relative	 majority	 party	 P1,	 another	 one	 due	 to	 the	contribution	of	the	positive	proposals	of	the	opposition	party	P2,	and	a	third	one	due	to	the	contribution	of	the	negative	proposals	of	P1:		 		(1)		
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B.	 In	 this	 region	N%ACC	is	 the	 sum	 of	 two	 terms,	 one	 due	 to	 the	 contribution	 of	 the	positive	proposals	 of	 P1	 and	 the	other	 one	due	 to	 the	 contribution	of	 the	positive	proposals	of	P2:		 													(2)		 C. In	this	region	N%ACC	is	due	only	to	the	contribution	of	the	positive	proposals	of	P1:		 (3)		D. Finally,	in	this	region	there	are	no	more	contributions	and	N%ACC	is	zero:		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													(4)		 What	 should	we	now	expect,	 in	 the	 limit	of	many	 legislative	 terms,	 for	 the	 theoretical	average	value	of	the	social	gain	YAV	produced	by	the	accepted	proposals	 inside	each	of	the	four	regions?	Of	course,	this	strictly	depends	on	the	kind	of	proposals	accepted:		 A. In	 this	 interval,	 positive	 and	 negative	 accepted	 proposals	 coming	 from	 the	 relative	majority	 party	 P1	give,	 on	 average,	 a	 globally	 null	 value	 of	 the	 social	 gain;	 the	 only	positive	 contribution	 to	 the	 social	 gain	 is	 given	 by	 the	 positive	 accepted	 proposals	coming	 from	 the	 relative	minority	party	P2.	But	now	we	need,	 again,	 to	distinguish	between	 two	 different	 perspectives:	 that	 one	 of	 the	 parties,	 for	which	 the	 average	social	gain	of	the	positive	proposals	is	worked	out	considering	the	parties	themselves	centered	at	Y=0,	and	that	of	the	independent	legislators,	for	which	the	average	social	gain	of	the	positive	proposals	coming	from	the	parties	is	centered	at	Y=0.5.	This	gives	rise	 to	 two	different	contributions,	weighted	by	 the	relative	number	of	both	parties	and	independent	legislators:		 											(5)			 B. In	 this	 interval,	 the	 negative	 proposals	 of	 P1	are	 no	 longer	 accepted,	 therefore	 the	average	 social	 gain	 results	 from	 the	 contribution	 of	 the	 positive	 proposals	 only,	coming	 from	 both	 P1	 and	 P2.	 Again,	 the	 different	 perspectives	 of	 parties	 and	independents	 give	 raise	 to	 two	 different	 contributions,	 weighted	 by	 their	 relative	number:		 											(6)			C. In	 this	 interval,	 the	 average	 social	 gain	 is	 only	 due	 to	 the	 contribution	 of	 positive	proposals	of	P1,	where	–	again	–	one	has	 to	distinguish	the	two	terms	representing,	respectively,	the	parties’	perspective	and	the	independent	legislators’	perspective:		 											(7)			
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N%ACC−D (Nind ) = 0
YAV−A (Nind ) =
N − Nind
N P1(Y )Y dY−1
1
∫ + P2 (Y )Y dY
0
1
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ +
Nind
N 0.5
YAV−B (Nind ) =
N − Nind
N P1(Y )Y dY0
1
∫ + P2 (Y )Y dY
0
1
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ +
Nind
N 0.5
YAV−C (Nind ) =
N − Nind
N P1(Y )Y dY0
1
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ +
Nind
N 0.5
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D. In	this	interval	no	more	proposal	are	accepted	at	all,	therefore	the	average	social	gain	should	be	null:				 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 											(8)		 We	 expect	 that	 this	 it	 is	 strictly	 true	 only	 in	 the	 limits	 of	 an	 infinite	 number	 of	 both	legislators	and	legislative	terms:	for	finite	numbers	of	them,	fluctuations	in	the	Gaussian	distributions	of	parties	and	in	their	positions	on	the	Y	axis	will	make	the	null	prediction	an	underestimation	of	the	numerical	results.		
	
APPENDIX	D	
	Exploiting	 the	 results	 of	 Appendix	 C,	 we	 calculate	 now	 the	 expected	 average	 global	efficiency	Effexp	of	our	parliament	as	a	function	of	p,	N	and	Nind,	in	the	four	regions	A,	B,	C	and	D.			To	do	so,	we	preliminarily	substitute	 in	all	 the	obtained	equations	the	various	definite	integrals	with	their	effective	values,	which	do	not	depend	on	p,	N	and	Nind	but	are	fixed.	These	values,	which	follow	from	the	normalization	of	the	probability	distributions	of	the	proposals,	are:			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 															(1)	 	Let	us	start	with	region	A	(with	0	<		Nind	<	thAB),	where	one	has:				 from	which,	after	some	algebra:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 																												(2)		 The	derivative	which	(for	any	p)	is	always	positive	within	the	interval	considered:					 Let’s	now	continue	with	region	B	(with	thAB	<		Nind	<	thBC),	where	we	find:					 	from	which	one	obtains:	 	 	 	 	 		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 																											(3)		
YAV−D (Nind ) = 0
Pi (Y )dY =1
−1
1
∫  ;     Pi (Y )dY = 0.5 ;    
0
1
∫ Pi (Y )Y dY = 0
−1
1
∫  ;    Pi (Y )Y dY = 0.06
0
1
∫     for  i =1,2
EffA (p,N,Nind ) = N%ACC−A ⋅YAV−A = p
N − Nind
N + (100 − p)
N − Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ⋅
N − Nind
N 0.06 +
Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ =
                           = N − NindN p + (100 − p) 0.5[ ]⋅ 0.06 −
Nind
N 0.06 +
Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟   →
                          → EffA (p,N,Nind )  = (1−
Nind
N )(50 +
p
2 )(0.06 + 0.44
Nind
N )
EffB (p,N,Nind ) = N%ACC−B ⋅YAV−B = p
N − Nind
N 0.5+ (100 − p)
N − Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ⋅
N − Nind
N (0.06 + 0.06)+
Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ =
                                   = N − NindN 0.5(p +100 − p)[ ]⋅ 0.12 −
Nind
N 0.12 +
Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟   →
                                 → EffB (N,Nind )  = 50 (1−
Nind
N )(0.12 + 0.38
Nind
N )
d
dx EffA (p, x) =
d
dx (1− x)(50 +
p
2 )(0.06 + 0.44x) = p(0.19 − 0.44x)− 44x +19 > 0    for   x < 0.43
EffA (p,N,Nind ) = N%ACC−A ⋅YAV−A = p
N − Nind
N + (100 − p)
N − Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ⋅
N − Nind
N 0.06 +
Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ =
                           = N − NindN p + (100 − p) 0.5[ ]⋅ 0.06 −
Nind
N 0.06 +
Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟   →
                          → EffA (p,N,Nind )  = (1−
Nind
N )(50 +
p
2 )(0.06 + 0.44
Nind
N )
EffB (p,N,Nind ) = N%ACC−B ⋅YAV−B = p
N − Nind
N 0.5+ (100 − p)
N − Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ⋅
N − Nind
N (0.06 + 0.06)+
Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ =
                                   = N − NindN 0.5(p +100 − p)[ ]⋅ 0.12 −
Nind
N 0.12 +
Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟   
                                   EffB (N,Nind )  = 50 (1−
Nind
N )(0.12 + 0.38
Nind
N )
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Notice	that	 inside	this	region	EffB	does	not	depend	on	p.	Furthermore,	 in	 its	maximum	possible	 range	 (i.e.	 between	 0	 and	 thBC(max)=65%),	 it	 has	 always	 a	maximum	whose	value	can	be	obtained	by	equating	to	zero	the	derivative:			 	 For	the	region	C	(with	thBC	<		Nind	<	thCD),	one	has:					 from	which	the	following	expression	can	be	derived:			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 												(4)		 The	derivative	(for	any	p)	is	always	negative	in	the	interval	considered:		 		 Finally,	for	region	D	(with		thCD	<		Nind	<	N):			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 											(5)		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EffC (p,N,Nind ) = N%ACC−C ⋅YAV−C = p
N − Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ⋅
N − Nind
N 0.06 +
Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ =
                                   = N − NindN
p
2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ⋅ 0.06 + 0.44
Nind
N
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟   →
                             → EffC (p,N,Nind )  = (1−
Nind
N )
p
2 0.06 + 0.44
Nind
N
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
EffD (p,N,Nind ) = N%ACC−D ⋅YAV−D = 0
d
dx EffB (p, x) =
d
dx 50 (1− x)(0.12 + 0.38x) =13− 38x = 0   →  x =
13
38 ≈ 0.34
d
dx EffC (p, x) =
d
dx (1− x)
p
2 0.06 + 0.44x( ) = p(0.19 − 0.44x) < 0    for   x > 0.43
EffC (p,N,Nind ) = N%ACC−C ⋅YAV−C = p
N − Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ⋅
N − Nind
N 0.06 +
Nind
N 0.5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ =
                                   = N − NindN
p
2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ⋅ 0.06 + 0.44
Nind
N
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟   →
                             → EffC (p,N,Nind )  = (1−
Nind
N )
p
2 0.06 + 0.44
Nind
N
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
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